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INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
Give me your tired, your poor, huddled masses yearning to
breathe free; the wretched refuse of your teaming shore. Send
these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the
golden door.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to asylum reflects one of the oldest themes of
America's history welcoming homeless refugees to our shores.
The United States has continually defined itself as a safe harbor,
sensitive to the plight of those who flee their country when
human rights are no longer respected. This alleged open door
policy, however, carries with it the reality that certain criteria
must be satisfied because refugee status cannot be afforded to all
those who seek it. Thus, the Refugee Act of 1980 and the case law
interpreting it attempt to define the width of the doorway to this
country. Currently, the door is opened too narrowly, barring
many Colombians from entering.
Imagine a place where death squads have destroyed towns
and villages, killing innocent victims. Refugees, who have left
their homes but cannot flee the country, search for safe havens,
often stripped of identity and possessions. Many are women with
children whose husbands were tortured, murdered, or
disappeared. This is not Kosovo. This is Colombia. Little noticed
by the outside world, a humanitarian disaster is underway in
Colombia.
The internal displacement of Colombians is a long-standing
and underreported crisis. Colombia's estimated 1 million internal
refugee population in 1997 ranked below only Sudan, Angola and
Afghanistan.2 Since they cross no international borders, the
plight of Colombia's internal refugees receives little media or
international attention. The United States' policy toward
Colombia, focused primarily, if not solely, on counter-narcotics
efforts, has all too often ignored the human price of those
internally displaced and those that muster the strength to reach
1. Emma Lazarus, inscription on the Statute of Liberty.
2. United States Department of State Country Conditions Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1997. [hereinafter United States DOS Country Report 1997], at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/1997 hrp reortlcolombia.html.
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our shores seeking asylum!
Though Kosovo helped focus the world's attention on human
rights and refugee concerns, Colombia's crisis remains ignored.
As the only Latin American country still caught in the torment of
a civil war, Colombia should sharply stand out in a region now
characterized by peaceful newfound democracies and developing
economies.
II. FOR WHOM Is THE DOOR OPEN? WHOM DOES THE UNITED
STATES CURRENTLY PROTECT WITH REFUGEE AND ASYLUM
PROVISIONS?
To qualify for asylum in the United States, an alien must
satisfy a set of basic criteria as set forth in the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Act [INA].' The individual must
demonstrate that he or she fits within the statutory definition of
a refugee and is eligible to apply for asylum.'
The United Nations Protocol defines "refugee" as a person
who is unwilling or unable to return to her country of nationality
based on a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of
five factors: 1) race, 2) religion, 3) nationality, 4) membership in a
particular group or 5) political opinion.6 This definition was
incorporated into the INA through the Refugee Act of 1980. 7
Therefore, to qualify for protection under the INA, an individual
must seek protection from outside her home country, and have a
well-founded fear of persecution in the home country founded on
3. Proposed United States Aid Package to Colombia is primarily for weapons and
training for the Colombian armed forces to counter narcotics. Elizabeth Becker, Clinton to
Offer Aid in Colombia Drug War, The N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2000 at 1-2; Secretary of State
Madeline K Albright, Statement on United States Assistance to Colombia, (Jan. 11, 2000)
(as released by the Office of Spokesman for United States Dept. of State); see also, United
States Committee for Refugees, Country Report: Colombia 1999 [hereinafter USCR
Country Report 1999](Reporting that during FY 1998, the United States only granted
refugee status to 64 Colombians while denying 278)(last visited Jan. 1, 2000).
4. Immigration and Naturalization Act [hereinafter INA] 8 U.S.C. §1158(a) (1994).
In order to be granted asylum the Attorney General must determine that an alien is a
.refugee" as defined by 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a)(42)(A).
5. Id.
6. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, [hereinafter CRSR] July 28,
1951, 188 U.N.T.S. 150, 152.
7. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)(codified in 8 U.S.C.
§1101-1158; the term refugee refers to someone outside the United States who meets the
definition, while asylee refers to someone present in the United States who meets the
definition.
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the aforementioned five factors.'
A. Outside the country of nationality
An alien who applies for refugee status must do so from
outside her home country.9 INA asylum relief is only limited to
applicants inside the United States, within its borders, or at the
ports of entry.0
B. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Persecution is a threat of unwarranted serious harm to life
or freedom." Serious physical harm generally constitutes
persecution. " Punishment for failing to comply with ideas that
are offensive to an individual's beliefs may amount to
persecution. Persecution may also be the result of governmental
action or action by a non-governmental entity that the
government knowingly tolerates or is unable to control. 3
C. Well-Founded Fear
A refugee's state of mind, corroborated by prevailing home-
country conditions, will indicate whether he has a reasonable
fear of persecution. 4 Therefore, a reasonable fear must be
demonstrated by subjective and objective evidence."
The subjective component of a well-founded fear may arise
8. CRSR, supra note 6.
9. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status [hereinafter UN Handbook] under the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1 34 (Geneva, 2d ed.
1992) available at httR://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/handbook/handeng/hbtoc.htm.
10. They have been held not to apply to certain aliens intercepted on the high seas.
See Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 502 U.S. 1084 (1992).
11. UN Handbook, paragraph 51. See also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222
(BIA 1985).
12. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 at 1 (BIA June 13, 1996)(holding that female
genital mutilation is a form of persecution).
13. UN Handbook, supra note 9, 65. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 at 1 (BIA
June 13, 1996)(granting asylum to a woman who belonged to a group which opposed
female genital mutilation in a place where female gential mutilation was imposed and
mandated).
14. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987).
15. UN Handbook, supra note 9, 38; see also, Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
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from the severe treatment of similarly situated persons."
Persecution of an asylum applicant's family, associates, or other
members of his race, religion, nationality, social or political
group, may serve to show that the applicant may also become a
victim of persecution, thereby indicating that the fear is well-
founded. 7
In addition, as the U.N. Handbook states, "[t]he applicant's
statements cannot.., be considered in the abstract, and must be
viewed in the context of the relevant background. ,, Objective
evidence, such as evidence of general country conditions,
including public records, newspaper articles and governmental
information, is also important to support a claim for refugee
status.' 9
D. Grounds of Persecution Most Applicable to
Colombians: Persecution on the Basis of
Political Opinion
Political opinion, like the other grounds of persecution, is not
defined by statute. Consequently, courts have drafted their own
interpretations of the elements necessary to demonstrate
persecution on this ground." Generally, a political opinion is a
viewpoint held by an individual that the persecutor seeks to
overcome."' The persecutor must view the individual's opinion as
a criticism or attack.22 If the persecutor knows the alien has such
a view, or imputes such a view to the alien, then he or she may
have a well-founded fear of persecution based on political
opinion. One may express political opinion through actions as
well as through words.
The Supreme Court in 1992, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
16. UN Handbook, supra note 9, 43.
17. Id.
18. UN Handbook, supra note 9, T 42.
19. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1506-09 (9th Cir. 1995)(noting that State
Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International
Reports presented by the asylum applicant were entitled to substantial weight). The laws
of the country of origin and how they are applied may also be useful, especially for trying
to show that punishment under a foreign judicial system constitutes persecution or that
persecution is established by governmental inaction or impunity. See Id. at n. 3.
20. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575-77 (9th Cir. 1986).
21. Matter of Sanchez & Escobar, 19 I.& N. Dec. 276, 284 (BIA 1985).
22. UN Handbook, supra note 9, T 80.
2000] 443
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however, narrowly construed the terms "persecution on account
of political opinion."23 The Supreme Court held that a guerrilla
organization's coercion does not necessarily constitute
persecution for asylum purposes because an alien's decision to
remain neutral amidst a civil strife does not constitute a political
opinion.24 In that case, Jairo Elias-Zacarias testified during
removal proceedings that he was subject to persecution if he
returned to his native Guatemala. He described how guerrillas
forced their way into his home and mandated that he and his
parents join their organization. Elias-Zacarias and his family
refused, and the guerrillas promised to return. Elias-Zacarias
testified that he believed joining the organization would subject
him to retaliation by the government.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia, reviewed the
applicable standards for granting asylum. He noted, first, that
the fear of persecution had to be such that a reasonable fact-
finder would conclude that it existed.25 Elias-Zacarias argued
that failure to join the guerrillas was itself tantamount to
expressing a political opinion. The Court was not persuaded,
holding instead that Elias-Zacarias had failed to show evidence
which compelled a reversal of the BIA decision."
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that a political opinion
could be expressed negatively as well as affirmatively.27 In doing
so, he espoused the prevailing Ninth Circuit case law at the time
of the Supreme Court's decision.
In 1984, before the Elias-Zacarias Supreme Court decision,
the Ninth Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS held that refusal
to join a guerrilla party because of a desire to be neutral in a civil
war was an expression of political opinion, entitling the alien to
political asylum." In Bolanos-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that:
[w]hen a person is aware of contending political forces
and affirmatively chooses not to join any faction, that
choice is a political one. A rule that one must identify
23. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
24. Id. at 483.
25. Id. at 483-84.
26. Id. at 483-84.
27. Id. at 486.
28. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 31:3444
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with one of two dominant warring political factions in
order to possess a political opinion, when many persons
may, in fact, be opposed to the views and policies of both,
would frustrate one of the basic objectives of the Refugee
Act of 1980 - to provide protection to all victims of
persecution regardless of ideology.29
For neutrality to constitute a political opinion, an alien must
have firmly established his neutrality by conduct or by speech."
Additionally, an alien must show that his wish to remain neutral
would cause persecution by offering, for instance, proof of
threats. 3' Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that "persecution on
account of political opinion [can exist] where one party to a
conflict insist[s] to the victim that the victim was aligned with
the other side."
The Ninth Circuit has recognized neutrality as a political
opinion.' Other circuits, however, have been reluctant to adopt
the neutrality doctrine. The First, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
have at times suggested that neutrality can constitute a political
opinion yet none have granted asylum on this basis.34 These
29. Id.
30. Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1991).
31. Id.
32. Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Singh v.
llchert, 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 533-34
(9th Cir. 1988)(holding that death threats by people on one side of a civil war against a
person suspected of being on the other side constitutes persecution on account of political
opinion); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1999)(holding that refusal to join
guerrillas because they kill people, including women and children, constitutes political
opinion); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987)(holding that a belief
that Armed Forces are responsible for lawlessness, rape, torture and murder constitutes a
political opinion); UN Handbook, supra note 9, T 80 (stating that a government's
persecution of persons to whom it attributes certain political opinions is persecution on
account of political opinion.)
33. Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9 h Cir. 1989); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d
1396 (9 Cir. 1987); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9 Cir. 1985).
34. Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990)(describing three situations
in which neutrality would constitute a political opinion: 1) if the persecutor has targeted
the alien out of dislike for neutrals; 2) if the persecutor has targeted the alien because the
alien refused to adopt the persecutor's political opinion; or, 3) if the persecutor has
targeted the alien because the alien holds the political opinion of an adversary, but
upholding BIA denial of asylum.); MA. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990)(declaring the
issue unclear and refusing to adopt the neutrality doctrine); Perlera-Escobar v. INS, 894
F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990)(denying asylum on the basis of neutrality reasoning that
interpretation of political opinion is a political question and stating its concern that the
Ninth Circuit's view on neutrality as a political opinion in the context of civil war would
"create a sinkhole that would swallow the rule." Id. at 1298-99.
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circuits more closely follow the Supreme Court's suggestion in
Elias-Zacarias that political neutrality is not an expression of a
political opinion for asylum purposes." The Ninth Circuit,
however, has prioritized the goals of the refugee statute above
the narrow interpretations given to it by the Supreme Court.
III. WHY THE DOOR IS Too NARROW FOR COLOMBIANS:
ASYLUM LAWS THAT ADVERSELY AFFECT COLOMBIAN
APPLICANTS
Refugee status represents a privileged form of migration. In
the United States, not every alien who meets the definition of
refugee is entitled to protection in the form of asylum."
Colombians have an uphill battle asking for political asylum for
primarily three reasons:
A. Colombians' Difficulty in Meeting the Grounds of
Persecution
Due to the violence in Colombia, many asylum applicants
from that country claim persecution on account of political
opinion.37 However, as the low asylum rates for Colombians
indicate, under the current system few Colombians can
successfully prove persecution on account of political opinion."
The main reason for this is the Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize political neutrality as an expression of political opinion
for asylum purposes.
As mentioned above, due to Elias-Zacarias the existing
Supreme Court precedent dictates that refusal to join a guerrilla
subversive group that is coercing participation does not
35. See Elias-Zacarias, 508 U.S. at 482.
36. Because an alien who satisfies the definition of asylum must also be granted
favorable discretion by an immigration judge before relief can be granted. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
37. Yves Colon, Miami: A Refuge From Violence: Growing Number of Middle Class
Colombians, The Miami Herald, May 23, 1999 at 2B.
38. Id. at 1B (stating that in 1996, for example, 250 requests for political asylum
were filed by Colombians and only 92 were granted; According to United States Rep.
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Congressional Research Service data shows that countries such as
Afghanistan are generating approval rates two and three times that of Colombia); USCR
Country Report, supra note 3, (noting that during FY 1998, the United States granted
refugee status to only 64 Colombians, denied 278 and at year's end was considering the
claims of 745 others).
[Vol. 31:3
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necessarily constitute a political opinion."5 The Supreme Court
held in Elias-Zacarias that guerrilla organization's coercion does
not necessarily constitute persecution on account of political
opinion for asylum purposes. This prohibits many Colombians
from being awarded the asylum protection they so desperately
need. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court fails to
recognize that in countries like Colombia failure to join the
guerrillas is equivalent to expressing a political opinion against
them.
1. Colombia's Civil War
Colombia is essentially a democracy under attack.4" The
principal participants in this civil strife include the Colombian
armed forces, the right-wing paramilitary groups and the left-
wing Marxist guerrilla groups. According to the United States
Department of State's 1998 Country Report on Human Rights in
Colombia, "paramilitary groups murdered, tortured and
threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in
an orchestrated campaign .. .'A Similarly, guerrillas
counterattacked the paramilitary by systematically murdering,
torturing and threatening civilians who were merely suspected of
supporting the paramilitary.4"
a. The Guerillas
The United States Department of State recognizes three
distinct communist rebel guerrilla armies - the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia - FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de
Liberacion Nacional - ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army
39. See Elias-Zacarias 502 U.S. at 478.
40. United States Department of State, Colombia Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1998 [hereinafter United States DOS Country Report 1998](stating that
Colombia's government continues to face serious challenges to its control over the
national territory)(last visited Jan. 1, 2000); John P. Leonard, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Remarks before the Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Washington D.C. (March 24,1999)(noting that Secretary Madeline Albright
identified Colombia as one of the democracies most under attack).
41. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
42. USCR Country Report 1999, supra note 3; United States DOS Country Report
1998, supra note 40.
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(Ejercito Popular de Liberacion - EPL) - "which reportedly
command from 10,000 to 15,000 full-time guerrillas, operating on
more than 100 fronts in an estimated 30 of the nation's 32
departments." 3 It is estimated that guerrilla fighters in effect
control at least 40% of Colombia's territory."' Their strategies or
tactics in attaining control of the country include: extra-judicial
killings, kidnapping, torture, targeting of civilian populations
and forced recruitment. ' For example, on October 18, 1998, just
after midnight, a guerrilla group bombed a pipeline near
Machuca, Antioquia. ' The oil and gases released reached the
nearby population where many residents depended on open
flames for light and cooking. The mixture ignited, engulfing
sixty-four dwellings and the sleeping families inside. Seventy-
three people, among them thirty-six children, were killed .
FARC - Founded in 1966 by Manuel Velez and other
members of the Communist Party's central committee, it is Latin
America's largest and one of the most violent guerrilla armies."
Illustrative of their operations was the major attack launched
against suspected paramilitary civilian supporters on December
28, 1998. The FARC guerrillas tortured, decapitated,
dismembered and castrated the men, and shot the women and
infants."
ELN - Established in 1965 under the leadership of Fabio
Vasquez Castano, it adopted a doctrine of insurrection inspired
by the Cuban Revolution." Its most famous member was Camilo
Torres, a Catholic priest who advocated a Christian Revolution to
overthrow the existing government and was killed in a clash
between ELN and the Colombian army in 1966.51 Manuel Perez
currently leads the group."
EPL - It was founded in 1968 by the Colombian Communist
43. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Paper on
Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Colombia, March 1998 [hereinafter UNHCR
Background Paper] available at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworldlcountrvcdr/cdrcol.htm.
44. USCR Country Report 1999, supra note 3.
45. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
46. Human Rights Watch: Colombia Report 1999 [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]
available at http://www.iac.aic.org/csn/199912/hrwcolombia1999.html.
47. Id.
48. UNHCR Background Paper, supra note 44.
49. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
50. UNHCR Background Paper, supra note 44.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Party - Marxist-Lennist.53 In January 1991, it signed a peace
agreement with the Government of then-President Cesar
Gaviria, in exchange for two seats in the Constituent Assembly.,
4
By March of that year, 2,000 EPL members had handed over
their weapons." Subsequently, the group joined the political
mainstream as the Hope, Peace and Liberty Party." One
dissident faction, however, remains. It retained the original
name of the group and continues to terrorize the Colombian
people in a plight to attain control, achieve economical reform
and draw attention to the exploitation of Colombia's natural
resources by foreign companies.57
b. The Colombian Army
Charged with the debilitating task of ending the communist
guerrilla insurrection and the right-wing paramilitary, the
Colombian armed forces is composed of 146,300 soldiers, of whom
121,000 are in the Army, 27,000 in the Navy, and 7,300 in Air
Force. 8 According to UN resources, the Army has created three
specialized counter-insurgency brigades, known as Mobile
Brigades, to counter guerilla offensives in different parts of the
country.59
The army itself, however, commits severe human rights
atrocities in collaboration with the paramilitary groups since
both have the same enemy - the guerrillas." The army routinely
assists the paramilitary in massacring the guerrillas and those
civilians whom they believe to be affiliated with the guerrillas.6"
The United States Department of State Human Rights Report
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
61. For instance, government investigators detailed direct collaboration between the
Medellin-based Fourth Army Brigade and paramilitaries commanded by Carlos Castano.
Repeatedly, paramilitaries killed those suspected of supporting guerrillas, then delivered
the corpses to the army. In a process known as "legalization," the army then claimed the
dead as guerrillas killed in combat while paramilitaries received their pay in weapons.
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 47.
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stated that at times the individual commanders and troops at
local levels armed, coordinated action with, or shared intelligence
with paramilitary groups; the Colombian armed forces condoned
and directly assisted the paramilitaries. In May 1998, for
example, the army formally disbanded the 20h Brigade (military
intelligence), which had an egregious human rights record
including the targeted killing of civilians and collaboration with
the paramilitary."2
c. Paramilitary Groups
Army-backed paramilitary groups are the third participants
in this bloody civil war. Declared illegal in 1989, they, like the
Colombian military, attack the guerrillas and anyone they
believe to be tied to the guerrillas." Despite reassurances and
promises by successive Colombian governments to dismantle
paramilitary forces, political killings and other human rights
violations by these groups have increased dramatically.' "Strong
evidence of continued Colombian armed forces' support for
paramilitary organizations has emerged in official and
independent investigations." Often, they are illegally armed
and trained by the Colombian Army brigade commanders. These
paramilitary groups have employed a strategy of systematic
terror, violence and intimidation against the civilian population
in areas of guerrilla presence as a means of securing control of
territory through the elimination of the guerrillas' real or
perceived civilian support base.
The paramilitary groups have terrorized rural Colombia for
more than 15 years, torturing, killing and then disappearing
with virtual impunity.' Paramilitary groups were said to be
responsible for 69% of all politically motivated extra-judicial
killings committed during the first nine-months of 1997.67 In
1999, paramilitaries were considered responsible for 78% of the
total number of human rights and international humanitarian
62. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
63. Amnesty International Report, Colombia: Just What Do We Have to Do to Stay
Alive?, AMR 23/48197, 7 (October 1997)[hereinafter Amnesty Int'l. Report].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. UNHCR Background Paper, supra note 44. (relying on Amnesty International
data).
67. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
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law violations.6s Their victims usually include unarmed non-
combatant civilians, such as teachers, labor leaders, town
mayors, community activists, members of indigenous
communities and peasants."' These people become targets for
their ties or for their perceived ties to the guerrillas. 7 For
instance, on May 16, 1998, armed paramilitary members entered
the town of Barrancabermeja, Santander Department, and
rounded up young adults and killed those people whom they
suspected of sympathizing with the guerrilla.7"
Paramilitary killings are extremely brutal. For example, in
January 1999, paramilitaries reportedly dragged twenty-seven
worshipers out of a church in Magdalena, then riddled their
bodies with bullets.7" That same week, authorities registered over
one hundred paramilitary killings, who mutilated their victims
and dumped bodies into rivers in order to destroy evidence."
The United States Supreme Court follows a neutrality
doctrine stating that the decision to remain neutral is not a
political opinion. However, in a hostile civil war, where the
participants are strategically targeting to torture, murder and
threaten civilians merely imputed with a particular political
opinion, i.e. siding with either the guerrilla or
paramilitary/government, this is a fiction. The forces in conflict
in Colombia do not recognize the neutrality of civilians. People
have been drawn into the conflict against their will because both
the guerrillas and government forces with their paramilitary
auxiliaries demand support and collaboration. Giving support to
one side of the hostility, even unwillingly, is frequently followed
by reprisals from the opposing side. Refusing to support one side
is automatically interpreted as an affiliation to the opposition.
Civilians in communities overrun by paramilitaries or
guerrillas are given two stark choices: they are told they can
either cooperate or die. Cooperation means not only surrendering
the community's life to total control by the armed group, but also
68. Human Rights Watch, supra note 47.
69. UNHCR Background Paper, supra note 44.
70. Id.
71. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40. Just twelve days before
the Barrancabermeja round-up, paramilitaries entered the town of Puerto Alvira and
murdered residents whom they suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers. Id.
72. Human Rights Watch, supra note 47.
73. Id.
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paying money to equip and arm the insurgency.74 Many people
are forced to join these groups and to accompany them on patrols,
where they are usually compelled to witness and commit human
rights violations against non-combatant civilians. Young children
have reportedly been "recruited" to patrol with the armed
insurgency. 75 As the paramilitary and guerrilla offensives extend
throughout the country, an increasing number of Colombians are
forced to flee in order to escape the growing violence.
Nevertheless, Colombians who flee to the United States and
seek political asylum are prejudiced by the Supreme Court's legal
myth that neutrality does not constitute a political opinion. This
precedent debilitates the United States' commitment to human
rights obligations, agreed upon with the signing of the 1967
Protocol.6 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit precedent,
espousing the political neutrality and imputed political belief
standards for determining the grounds for persecution on the
basis of political opinion, relies heavily upon international law.
This demonstrates a willingness by the Ninth Circuit to obligate
the United States to the Protocol it signed in 1967.77
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has authority over the
Ninth Circuit, and it will most likely attempt to further define
the political opinion requirement, creating new tests and rigid
standards with which circuits must comply. In the process,
thousands of Colombian refugees will be sent back to the hands
of their oppressors to be abused, tortured, and murdered.
74. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
75. Id. (noting that the Colombian army estimated that 3,000 children were
guerrilla members).
76. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 6225.
77. The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status in
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6224; Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9 Cir. 1992)(holding that a political belief
imputed to the applicant by his persecutor is grounds for political asylum). In that case,
the Ninth Circuit utilized the "imputed political belief' standard in Barraza-Rivera v.
INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9' Cir. 1990), where it held that punishment based on objection
to participation in inhumane acts as part of forced military service is persecution within
the meaning of the Refugee Act. The Ninth Circuit relied on the UN Handbook. The court
found ample support in paragraph 167 of the Handbook, where it stated that punishment
for desertion or draft evasion, in itself, does not constitute persecution on account of
political opinion, but paragraph 169 provides that disproportionately severe punishment
on account of a political opinion does constitute persecution. Importantly, the Handbook
advises that an alien may qualify for refugee status after either desertion or draft evasion
if he or she can show that military service would have required the alien to engage in acts
contrary to the basic rules of human conduct. The Handbook became the Ninth Circuit's
preferred resource for applying international law to the asylum provisions of the INA.
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B. DISQUALIFICATION OF GENERALIZED VIOLENCE & FEAR
Second, the inquiry's specific focus on individualized
persecution based on a particular factor has denied protection to
many Colombians who fear situations of rampant violence in
their home country. Colombia's situation exemplifies the
difficulty people have in satisfying the claim of individually
directed persecution in the context of a civil war. Individuals who
are "war refugees" fleeing armed conflict are not entitled to
protection as refugees in the United States.78
Situations of general violence, while perhaps more perilous
for the individual, nonetheless make it more difficult to meet the
standard for political asylum. "If there is random violence in a
country, such as civil war, it is of little consolation to an
individual struck by a stray bullet that the person who pulled the
trigger was aiming at someone else."" The Colombian situation
reveals how a narrow construction of an already narrow
definition of refugee leaves individuals who cannot satisfy the
"individually targeted" requirement without any statutory right
to asylum."0 The case of Martinez-Romero v. INS addresses this
point directly.8' In upholding the BIA's denial of asylum, the
court stated:
If we were to agree with the petitioner's contention that
no person should be returned to El Salvador because of
the reported anarchy present there now, it would permit
the whole population, if they could enter this country in
some way, to stay here indefinitely. 2
This case illustrates how asylum law is deficient in
protecting individuals who face extremely real dangers if
78. Matter of Medina, 19 1. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA 1988) (acknowledging that although
there is a growing international practice of granting persons fleeing armed conflict
temporary refuge, this is not done on the basis of international law, and thus, the practice
is not binding on the United States).
79. H.R. Rep. No. 100-627, 100' Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1988).
80. Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R.2922 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees and Int'l Law, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1988) (statement of
Arthur Helton, Director, Political Asylum Project, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights). "An alien must satisfy the statutory definition of refugee in order to be eligible
for asylum.... Aliens who do not satisfy the statutory definition of refugee are therefore
not legally entitled to any protection in the United States."
81. Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9" Cir. 1982).
82. Id.
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returned to their homeland. The United States, however, is far
more amenable to individualized persecution, although the fear
of generalized persecution is just as compelling. The common
thread in all such cases is the fear of immediate violence."
However, Colombian civilians, unlike most in a civil war
setting, are not collateral victims to the widespread violence in
their country. They are being targeted; their deaths and torture
are part of a strategic plan to eliminate civilian support for the
opposing armed force. Therefore, although traditionally mere
victims of civil war do not meet the definition of refugee, a vast
number of Colombian civilians are, in fact, being individually
targeted for persecution.
In Colombia, clashes between armed groups are rare.' In the
majority of cases, paramilitary forces and the guerrillas have
directed their attacks against sectors of the civilian population
believed to support rival armed groups. They are not collateral
victims and the United States should more readily recognize this,
and not treat them as such, in order to afford Colombians the
asylum protection that they need. 5
C. Foreign Policy Agenda in Asylum Decision
Third, the burden to attain asylum is especially difficult for
those aliens from nations with a favorable relationship with the
United States, nations which the United States would not want
to label as "persecuting."
One commentator suggests that the problem with a standard
based on a "well-founded fear of persecution" is that it enhances
the willingness to grant refugee status and asylum protection to
persons in flight from an unfriendly state." Therefore,
83. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Et.al., Immigration And Citizenship: Process and
Policy (4th ed. 1998) (citing from Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, & Sergio Aguayo, Escape
From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World 269 (1989)).
84. Amnesty Int'l. Report, supra note 64, at 11.
85. Id.
86. James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee
Law, 31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 129, 168-169 (1990):
It is unlikely that a state will grant refugee status to the nationals of a compatible state
in other than the most patently egregious circumstances, because the threshold of
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governments more frequently recognize the existence of
persecution only in cases in which their own policies or political
interests are not prejudiced by such recognition."
Inherent in a determination of "persecution" is some
judgment regarding the legitimacy of the government. As a
result, claims of genuine well-founded fear of persecution are
evaluated with United States political objectives, sometimes over
the protection of the individual. For instance, in the case of El
Salvador, the United States government was reluctant for many
years to acknowledge the dangerous conditions in the country.
The Reagan Administration's support for El Salvador's
government caused a resistance to grant political asylum to
Salvadorans who faced persecution by their government.88
An illustrative example of the disparate treatment is a
comparison of claims for political asylum by Salvadorans and
Iranians. In the case of a Salvadoran who feared persecution
from both the insurgent guerrilla organization because of his
refusal to join it, and from the Salvadoran government who
believed he had joined the guerrilla organization, the BIA held
that the guerrilla organization had a right to enforce established
rules of military conduct, including a right to punish violators
who resist induction." The BIA also held that the government
had a right to seek out that individual to determine if he was
truly part of this insurgent organization."
Finally, the BIA found that although the individual was
targeted by both groups, there was no proof that the individual's
political opinion was the motivating factor, and thus it did not
constitute persecution on account of political opinion. 1 In
contrast, when cases involved Iranian aliens, political asylum
tolerance will normally rise as a function of the general esteem in which the state of
origin is held as well as its political importance.
Id. at 169.
87. Id.
8& See, e.g., Robert Rubin, Ten Years After: Vindication for Salvadorans and New
Promises for Safe Haven and Refugee Protection, 68 Interpreter Releases 97, 98 (1991).
In response to the low asylum approval rates for Salvadorans, the American Baptist
Church brought a class action suit on behalf of Salvadorans alleging bias in the INS
adjudication process. They were granted a settlement entitling them to de novo asylum
interviews. American Baptist Church v. Thornburgh, 760 F.Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
89. In re Matter of Maldonado Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988), rev'd 883 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1989); see also, Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482 (1992).
90. In re Matter of Maldonado Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 518.
91. Id.
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claims were upheld with little proof of the individual's political
activity. In these cases, the BIA did not even mention this
government's right to enforce their laws against those in
opposition. Instead, one decision merely stated that "[t]he Service
does not dispute that opponents of the Ayatollah Khomeini are
often persecuted for their opposition."
92
This comparison demonstrates that individual claims of
asylum are influenced by the relationship of the United States
with the nations involved. This is despite the passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980, which was intended to deplete asylum
adjudication of foreign policy consideration.93 Therefore, the bias
in foreign policy for or against a particular nation may make the
threat of persecution seem less grave in countries to which the
United States is more favorably disposed, and more serious in
countries to which the United States has a more hostile
attitude.9 4
The United States, similarly, does not want to label
Colombia as persecuting for reasons that advance the political
agenda of the United States. The United States policy towards
Colombia focuses mainly on counter-narcotics efforts and all too
often forgets the Colombian people. Illustrative of this is
President Clinton's $1.28 billion proposed aid package to
Colombia, the largest part of which would be spent on military
hardware, to train and equip the Colombian army in order to
more effectively fight against narcotic traders.95 Such a package
would make Colombia the third largest recipient of United States
assistance in the hemisphere and the third after Israel and
Egypt, globally.96 Most of the money for this proposal would be
under the direction of the State Department. 7 The same State
Department that declared in its Human Rights Report for
Colombia that:
The Government's human rights record remained
92. Matter of Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. 3028, slip op. (BIA June 12, 1987).
93. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigation the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1247, 1262 (1990)(Congress replaced refugee provisions that
made specific ideological references with a more politically neutral definition).
94. Id. at 1264.
95. See Becker, supra note 3.
96. Fact Sheet released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, April 23, 1999.
97. Id.
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poor... Government forces continued to commit serious
abuses, including extrajudicial killings .... The
authorities rarely brought officers of the security forces
and the police charged with human rights offenses to
justice... [and] [alt times the Colombian security forces
collaborated with the paramilitary groups that
committed abuses.98
In essence, the United States is proposing to provide the
same army that aided the paramilitary, which committed 78% of
the total number of human rights and international
humanitarian law in 1999,"9 with billions of dollars worth of
weapons. It seems ludicrous that the United States would offer a
country as violent as Colombia more guns and ammunition with
which to fuel more violence and death.
United States foreign policy affects the way asylum decisions
are made because the United States does not want to label the
very government it is funding with billions of dollars as
"persecuting." However, the stark reality is that the Colombian
government's army and police commit numerous human rights
violations, including social cleansing."' Moreover, when military
officers were tried, convicted and sentenced for human rights
violations, they generally did not serve out their prison terms
and in some cases even remained on active military duty;
Colombia's impunity rate is 97-98% for all crimes.'
The U.S. foreign policy agenda centers on the belief that
Colombia's violence is due to a drug war. Consequently, asylum
decisions do not adequately reflect the political violence in
Colombia, which hinders the plight of those victims seeking
asylum on the basis of political opinion. The war in Colombia is
not about drugs; the participants may economically benefit from
drug money, but it is not a drug war. The guerrilla groups and
the paramilitaries have a political agenda. According to the
United States Ambassador to Colombia, "Ithe guerrilla groups in
effect are arguing that Colombia has had an unjust society, has
had insufficient economic development especially in rural
98. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
99. Human Rights Watch, supra note 47.
100. Id.
101. United States DOS Country Report 1998, supra note 40.
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areas.""2 The paramilitaries are a reaction against the guerrilla;
they developed to protect their property against guerrilla
attacks."3 All of the paramilitary groups state that their actions
are politically justified." However, unlike guerrilla movements
elsewhere in the world that have a certain degree of public
support, documented scientific polls indicate that only about 4%
of the Colombian population support the guerrillas."0
As long as the United States continues to ignore the political
nature of the war in Colombia and continues to call it a narco-
war, thereby allowing it to fight and fund its own war on drugs,
thousands of Colombians will be deprived of political asylum.
IV. TEMPORARY SOLUTIONS: TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE
STATUS
The Temporary Protective Status (TPS) statute is an
important recognition of the need for legislation to protect those
individuals who fall through the gap between immigration policy
and refugee law. As part of the Immigration Act of 1990,106
Congress intended to provide for the temporary protection of
aliens present in the United States who have been forced to flee
certain dangerous conditions in their homeland."7 The provision
directed at accomplishing this protection is Section 1254(a),
entitled "Temporary Protected Status.""' This section authorizes
the Attorney General to confer temporary protective status on
nationals of a foreign state who are experiencing dangerous
conditions and allows them to remain in the United States until
conditions in their country improve.09 The Attorney General
may designate the nationals of any foreign state as temporarily
protected if the Attorney General finds the following: 1) such
foreign state is experiencing civil strife - ongoing armed conflict
102. Curtis Warren Kamman, United States Ambassador to Colombia, Colombia:
What Are We Getting Into?, Presentation for the Secretary's Open Forum Conversation
Series, (Nov. 1, 1999) at
http://www.state.gov/www/deptlouenforum/roceedingst991101 kamman.html.
103. UNHCR Background Paper, supra note 44.
104. Kamman, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
107. INA 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1994).
108. Id
109. Id. at § 1254(a)(a)(1)(A).
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within the state, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary
conditions; 2) requiring persons to return would pose a serious
threat to their safety; and 3) such a finding would not be contrary
to our national interest."O
"The United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) has
called on the United States to provide TPS to Colombians
residing in the United States.""' USCR senior policy analyst,
Hiram A. Ruiz, stated that "the violence has reached into
previously unaffected areas of the country, including urban
areas. The number of civilians killed has increased, and the
number of civilians displaced as a result of the violence has
skyrocketed.""' He noted that in essence "no region of the
country is untouched by the violence and all civilians are
potential targets of the violence. Many people fear for their lives
on a daily basis.""' USCR estimates that more than 1.2 million
Colombians have been forced to flee their homes due to continued
armed conflict."' In 1998, 300,000 people, mainly women and
children, were newly displaced, and 50,000 more were displaced
in the first three months of 1999.' In a letter to Immigration
and Naturalization Services Commissioner Doris Meissner,
USCR stated:
Given the escalation of conflict in Colombia and the
Colombian government's inability to protect civilians
from danger, we believe it is wrong to return Colombian
nationals now residing in the United States who fear for
their lives should they have to return to Colombia. We
therefore encourage you to urge the Attorney General to
designate national and habitual residents of Colombia
for TPS."1
Further urges for Temporary Protective Status for Colombians
were heard on July 20, 1999, when thousands of Colombians
110. Id. at § 1254(a)(b)(1)(A-C).
111. United States Committee for Refugees Calls on United States Government to
provide Temporary Protection for Colombians, at
http:/fwww.refugees.org/newslpress releases/1999/072999.htm.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. USCR Country Report, supra note 3.
116. Id.
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rallied in Miami and other United States cities calling for TPS.117
TPS is an ideal "temporary" solution to the ignored
humanitarian crisis in Colombia for two reasons. First, Congress
created this mechanism precisely to respond to such situations of
wide-spread violence to protect those aliens whose native
countries were torn with strife, yet who did not qualify as
refugees."'  Second, TPS rectifies the problem of apparent
negative judgments against the United States' allies by sending a
message that the government's purpose in extending TPS to
foreign nationals is not meant to be a negative political judgment
on the home country is government. It does not condemn the
government as immoral or acting inhumanely. It proposes that
there may be circumstances where their government may be the
victim, causing these problems. This is an important
consideration because foreign policy taints asylum decisions, and
the United States is hesitant to label a friendly state as a
"persecutor." The customary norm of temporary refuge is one
that merely responds to the basic human need for protection that
cannot be afforded by the home country because of its
preoccupation with civil unrest.'9 It is not meant as a sanction
for a nation's unethical behavior.""
Therefore, just as TPS was awarded to Nicaraguans because
of the civil war that plagued their country, Colombians should be
granted TPS for the civil war that has plagued their country for
40 years. The United States has ignored the humanitarian crisis
in Colombia and its civilian-victims for too long. Granting TPS to
Colombians will not only extend protection to thousands of
individuals, it will also send a clear message that the United
States recognizes the severity of the crisis in Colombia.
117. Sonji Jacobs, Thousands Demand Protected Status for Colombians, The Miami
Herald, July 21, 1999, at 3B.
118. H.R. REP., supra note 80.
119. Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a
Customary Norm, 26 VA.J Intl L. 551, 554 (1986).
120. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
While the primary purpose of asylum is to provide
humanitarian relief to those who might face harm upon
deportation, the conflicting concerns of protecting people and of
maintaining control over our borders has led to a narrow
construction of the possible causes for persecution outlined in the
refugee definition.121 Colombia's unique and misunderstood
country-conditions, coupled with this narrow construction, places
an onerous hurdle that few Colombian applicants can overcome.
Colombians must show first that they meet the narrowly
construed factor of persecution because of political opinion and,
second that they are being individually targeted for persecution
as a result of that factor.
Moreover, the United States has a general misunderstanding
of the situation in Colombia. The victims of this civil strife are
usually categorized as collateral victims to the drug war;
however, the strife is between long-standing political
insurgencies, which recently began funding their operations with
the lucrative drug business. They have existed for 40 years,
before Colombia's drug empire and cartels were created. The
United States cannot fully ignore the crisis, however, because it
realizes that it cannot do so and fight its own effective war on
drugs. Therefore, it takes Colombia under its "wing" but only to
achieve its own political agenda of drug reform. The United
States has taken a myopic stance to the humanitarian crisis
occurring in Colombia. Until it realizes that armed insurgencies
do not recognize the neutrality of civilians and that the armed
conflict is political in nature, thousands of Colombians will be
denied the political asylum they urgently need, not only to
exercise the rights that Americans exercise daily, but more
importantly, to stay alive.
Temporary Protective Status provides just that - temporary
protection. But, nevertheless, it is an ideal solution until either
the asylum decision-makers become more educated about the
grave situation in Colombia or the civil war in Colombia ceases.
Whichever action the United States decides to take, it should be
121. Derek Smith, A Refugee by Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of
Immigration Appeals'Action in Asylum Cases, 75 Va. L.Rev. 681, 690 (1989).
2000]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
taken quickly because each day many more silently lose their
lives, adding to the already appalling Colombian death toll and
increasing the severity of this ignored crisis.
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